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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Problem
"Safety First" is a popular theme, inside and outside
of the workplace.

Yet every day, accidents happen.

In the

business world, an accident automatically results in lost
productivity.

Production and/or service is delayed while

the area is secured, reports made, and medical treatment
applied, if necessary.

In the last two decades safety has

carried a high level of importance.

The passage of the

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 is one reason.
In addition, as American companies face increased
competition in the global arena, they are looking for ways
to increase quality and decrease costs.

In today's

competitive environment, every second counts.
Workers' accidents are extremely costly in more than
one way.

In terms of moral responsibility, society now

expects employers to provide a safe working environment.
Morally, the costs of accidents must be expressed in terms
other than monetary.

The employees involved and/or injured

may suffer emotional damage, and society also pays the price
in terms of death or serious disabilities of individuals
(Finkin, Goldman, & Summers, 1989).
Employers' legal responsibilities have been accentuated

2

by the passage of OSHA.

In the case of an employee's death

caused by willful violations of the employer, not only are
substantial monetary fines imposed, but individuals of the
company may face criminal prosecution, and imprisonment
(Finkin et al., 1989).

In addition, companies have a

financial responsibility for safety.
be broken down into two categories.

Costs of accidents can
The first category is

insurable costs, which cover medical treatment and temporary
and permanent disability payments to the employee(s).
Uninsurable costs are those involving administration, such
as accident investigation and reporting.

Also involved are

the costs of lost productivity because of work stoppage at
the time of the accident, repair or replacement of damaged
equipment, loss of the injured employee(s)' production, and
overtime or replacement costs necessary to fill in for the
injured employee.

There is the added cost of providing the

injured employee benefits while out on disability (Meola,
1990).

In addition, companies face an incredible liability

in terms of possible OSHA fines. The financial costs can add
up quickly, no matter how minor the accident/injury.

The

company's responsibility to its shareholders is to make
profit.

Yet, accident costs can greatly affect the success

or failure in this goal.
As companies look for ways to prevent accidents from
occurring, many causes may surface. The use of unsafe
equipment, lack of knowledge, and the push for speed in
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production are some of these reasons.
Many employers feel that employees themselves do not
care about safety, or at least are not aware of its
importance.

To change this prevailing attitude, employers

look for ways to increase safety awareness.

One popular

means of reducing accidents is the use of safety incentive
programs.

By offering employee awards for an accident free

time period, employers are attempting to lower the accident
rate.

Another approach to reduce accidents is through

behavior management, where an employee's job is broken down
into steps, and safe behavior applied to each step of the
process.

The use of incentives are often used in this type

of program, rewarding employees for their safe behavior.
Studies have shown, however, that training and knowledge,
combined with feedback, will induce employees to practice
safe behavior (Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson, 1980).
Problem Statement
This thesis researches occupational safety programs,
and attempts to define the factors necessary for success in
developing a safe workplace.

The following chapters will

discuss the evolution of safety management, review studies
of the various types of safety programs, and discuss the
similarity of safety and total quality management.

In

addition, a research study of the effectiveness of one
company's safety program will be discussed.

All of these

topics are covered in the search for the answer to the
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research question:
How can a safety program be more effective?

CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLUTION OF SAFETY MANAGEMENT
The beginning of safety programs evolved as workers
began the fight for unionization and workers compensation
laws.

At this time, if an employee was injured, there was

no economic support available for the employee who was not
able to continue working.

Common law favored the employer

in the form of the "'Unholy Trinity'" (Finkin, et al., 1989,
p. 364).

This term represented the three defenses used by

employers to win lawsuits.

Assumption of risk, contributory

negligence, and/or the fellow servant rule prevented
employees from collecting money from the employer for
injuries incurred on the job.
However, the issue of safety was becoming a public
concern, and in 1867 Massachusetts began factory inspections
(Colling, 1990, p.3).

In 1869 the Bureau of Labor

Statistics was formed to begin study on the kind and causes
of accidents in factories.

The first safety legislation was

passed in 1877, requiring use of guards for hazardous
machinery.

In 1892, the first recorded safety program was

developed at the Illinois Steel Company, in response to an
explosion of a flywheel.

A committee of executives was

formed to evaluate the accident, and as a result, all
5
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flywheels were then inspected and tested.
Finally, in 1908, the first worker's compensation law
was passed, covering federal employees.

In 1911, New Jersey

became one of the first states to pass workers' compensation
laws.

As a result, one writer concludes:

"Workmen's

compensation laws have done more to promote safety than all
other measures collectively, because employers found it more
cost effective to concentrate on safety than to compensate
employees for injury or loss of life" (Colling, 1990, p. 4).
The approach toward safety during this period had been
greatly affected by Frederick W. Taylor's work, The
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911.

Taylor's

efficiency studies highlighted the effects of lost time,
lost personnel, and lost materials due to accidents on
efficiency.

This "led to an early understanding of the

important interrelationship between safety and management
that we recognize today" (Colling, 1990, p.l).

The

responsibilities of management in the early part of the
century were defined differently than they are today.

In a

1921 study, The Health of the Industrial Worker, the
researchers discuss the prevalence of eye injuries in the
stone-cutting industry.

They write:

These injuries (called by the men "fires" in the eye)
are practically entirely preventable by the wearing of
suitable goggles; the glass of goggles, however, in a
few weeks becomes frosted from the frequent impact of
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particles and requires renewal.

The men prefer to run

the risk rather than take this small trouble, and men
are to be seen at work, who have already lost the sight
of one eye, still declining to wear goggles (Collis &
Greenwood, 1921, p. 187).
In situations like these, injuries were viewed as the result
of worker carelessness.

As long as safety equipment was

provided, even if not utilized, management accepted no
further responsibility to the worker.
In 1931, Herbert

w.

Heinrich made a major impact on the

field of safety with the publication of Industrial Accident
Prevention.

While working for the Travelers Insurance

Company, Heinrich analyzed 75,000 industrial accidents.

He

concluded that 88% of accidents were due to unsafe acts of
workers, 10% to unsafe conditions, and 2% of accidents were
unavoidable.

Heinrich created the first theory of accident

causation, built upon a list of ten statements he termed the
"Axioms of Industrial Safety" (Heinrich, 1931, pp. 13-14).
Heinrich's theory became known as the "Domino Theory"
(Heinrich, 1931, pp. 14-15), in that he named five
sequential accident factors (ancestry and social
environment, fault of person, unsafe act and/or
mechanical/physical hazard, accident, and injury) which
affect each other just as dominoes placed on end do.

The

removal of the third factor, that of the unsafe act/hazard,
can prevent the other factors from resulting in an injury.
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This theory greatly influenced how management approached
safety control for years.

"Most safety programs which are

built upon the principles of control have their roots in the
original Domino Theory and its management-oriented updated
forms" (Collings, 1990, p.30).
In a 1939 work titled Industrial Hygiene, the authors
provide management with a checklist for promoting the health
of workers.

Under the topic of work place they discuss

factors such as noise level, work positions, and body
mechanics.

They advise that provision of a safe environment

can be accomplished through safety engineering and safety
education.

Other topics covered are employment and

placement, the organization of work, supervision, health
instruction for the worker, and extra factory activities.
In a prelude to management theory of today, the authors
advise "the want for a feeling of personal worth is one of
the most fundamental desires of man.

This feeling of

personal worth comes largely from satisfactory relationships
with one's superior and with one's associates" (Lanza

&

Goldberg, 1939, p. 587).
Greatly influenced by Heinrich's work, other
researchers have continued building theories on safety.

The

Ferrell Human Factor Model is based on the premise that
accidents are the result of a chain of incidents beginning
with human error.
error:

Ferrell defines three situations of human

1) overload, which occurs when the work load and the
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capacity of the person is mismatched, 2) an incorrect
response by the person to the situation, and 3) an improper
activity (Collings, 1991, p. 31).
A contemporary safety researcher, Dan Peterson, further
developed the Ferrell system, to include system failure.
Peterson's Accident/Incident Causation Model has more
clearly defined categories of human error:

1) overload,

2) ergonomic traps, and 3) decision to err (Heinrich,
Petersen, & Roos, 1980).
of decision to err.

Peterson expands on the category

He acknowledges that the employee is

often able to choose to perform the task unsafely, and that
this choice may be made either consciously or unconsciously.
Major reasons in this decision are peer influences, time
pressures, and priorities set by social, political, and/or
economic forces.

Peterson's model has moved the field of

safety to the point of acknowledging that an unsafe act is
not just the result of a poor decision by an employee, but
rather, may be pre-determined by extenuating factors.

This

then poses new challenges to safety professionals.
Management theory needs to be incorporated into the field of
safety in order to create an environment which values and
promotes safety.
In review of management theories of today, Collings
connects Herzberg's (1968) two-factor theory to safety.

In

Herzberg's theory, motivators are those factors that provide
sources of satisfaction, while hygiene factors are those
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that are the source of dissatisfaction. Safety falls under
the area of hygiene factors.

As a result, meeting all

safety needs can only reduce job dissatisfaction.
Therefore, "to create job satisfaction, we must turn to the
motivators.

In other words, we have to set up a competent

safety program to eliminate dissatisfaction, and then
determine what else our people need to provide satisfaction"
(Collings, 1990, pp. 40-41).
The use of management theory incorporated into the
field of safety has increased the success of safety
programs.

However, new challenges from the technological

growth have continued to affect employees' safety.

The

actual work environment of most businesses has experienced
major change.

New products, chemicals, and machinery

continued to increase the threat to worker's health and
safety.

Although by 1960 most states had some type of

safety and occupational health laws, there was often little
enforcement (Finkin, et al., 1989, p. 365).

In

congressional testimony, the Secretary of Labor testified
"that in 1968 an estimated 14,500 workers were killed and
2.2 million were disabled each year in industrial accidents,
resulting in a loss of 250 million man days of work and $8
billion loss in Gross National Product" (Finkin, et al.,
1989, p. 366).

Congress decided that national legislation

was necessary to force all companies to create safer working
environments.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of
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1970 was passed as a result.
employers.

OSHA places two duties on

The first is that of the "general duty clause:

Each employer--l)shall furnish to each of his employees
employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
death or serous physical harm to his employees ... " (Finkin
et al., 1989, p. 367).

In addition, the second duty is that

every employer must comply with OSHA standards.

The passage

of OSHA has made it even more important that employers
utilize all of their resources to create and promote a safe
environment.
In summary, the area of safety has grown from one of
individual responsibility to the legal, moral, and economic
responsibility of corporations.

New technology, as well as

an increasingly diverse workforce has forced companies to
look for different and innovative ways to achieve safety.
While provision of a safe environment is an important base
factor for safety, individual behavior remains as the area
in which companies search for the best method to inspire
safety.

The next chapter will review the literature on the

diverse types of safety programs.

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
overview
Because it is usually impossible to eliminate all
environmental deterrents to safety, it is necessary to
influence employees to avoid unsafe acts.

In a review of

safety literature, Peters (1991) identifies five strategies
to improve safety performance:

incentives, disciplinary

actions, fear messages, behavior modeling, and employee
surveys.

In selecting one of these strategies, he advises

that the cost and effectiveness of the method be reviewed,
as well as the nature of work, the social and physical
components of the work environment, the attitudes of both
management and labor, and the available resources.
In the area of incentives for safe behavior, after
reviewing the literature, Peters identifies the need for
further research to determine which incentives are more
successful, and under what conditions they are helpful.
addition, the longevity of the effects of the incentive
needs to be studied.

While reviewing the use of

disciplinary actions, Peters reveals that there is little
evidence of those organizations who utilize discipline in
safety, and whether or not it is effective.
12

He concludes

In
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that positive reinforcement is more widely advocated than
the negative actions of discipline.
In regards to the use of fear messages, the longevity
of attitude and behavior changes due to fear messages are
two areas also needing further research.

In addition, the

discrepancy between attitude changes and behavior changes
continues to be unexplained.

Behavior modeling, defined as

(a) viewing the approved behavior,

(b) practicing the

behavior, and (c) transferring the behavior learning to the
actual environment, has not yet been determined to be an
effective technique for motivating employees to increase
their self-protective behavior.
In discussing the fifth area, Peters recommends using
employee survey results to facilitate group discussions.
These discussions can result in higher levels of interest,
in-depth thinking, and commitment to safety rules.

The

increase in employee involvement also results in elevated
awareness, a strengthening of employee beliefs of the
seriousness of hazards, as well as an individual's sense of
control over their personal safety.
In summary, Peters' review demonstrates the varied
approaches to safety while highlighting the need for further
research in all areas.

Behavior-modeling and the use of

incentives are the most widely studied systems, and this
paper will review some of the more recent works.

In

addition, studies on employee attitudes, fear messages, and
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quality of work life and their affect on safety will be
reviewed.
Positive Reinforcement and Feedback
In a paper by McAfee and Winn (1989), 24 studies on the
use of positive reinforcement and feedback on safety are
reviewed.

All of the studies evaluated utilized statistical

data, a before and after design, and provided enough details
to compare with the other studies.

The independent

variables of the overall review are "(a) monetary
incentives,

(b) praise and feedback, and (c) team

competitions which may also have involved the use of cash
awards" (McAfee & Winn, 1989, p. 9).

The dependent

variables were the causal variables, such as using
protective equipment, and the end-result variables, or the
actual injuries.

All of the studies looked at short-term

outcome variables rather than long-term ramifications, such
as employee satisfaction.
The review of studies found that each concluded that
the use of incentive/feedback improved safety and or reduced
the number of accidents.

However, limitations were found,

and the causal relationship between the reward/feedback and
the outcome were not explained in the studies.

McAfee and

Winn developed a model that "suggests that the relationship
between incentives/feedback and these end-result variables
may be moderated by three situational variables
(environmental, individual, and task characteristics)"
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(McAfee & Winn, 1989, p. 16).

While concluding with several

topics of proposed future studies, these researchers reflect
that the reviewed works serve as alternatives to traditional
safety programs, as well as provide examples of how to
design safety programs to fit specific work conditions.
Karan and Kopelman (1986) researched the effects of
feedback on the safety related outcomes of vehicular
accidents and industrial accidents.

The use of feedback can

act as a reinforcer as well as a punisher.

Three vehicle

maintenance and dispatch facilities of a nation-wide package
forwarding organization were studied.

During a 43-week

period, Facility A was provided feedback in regards to the
number of accidents during the current fiscal year to date,
the number of accidents during the same period the previous
year, the number of days since the last accident, and a
ranking in terms of improvement.

The results were given for

each shift of employees in the facility.
were utilized as comparison groups.

Facilities Band C

The researchers

concluded that the institution of objective outcome feedback
resulted in a 22.32% improvement in vehicular safety
performance and a 15.88% improvement in the industrial
safety performance.

The use of feedback was successful in

that accidents occurred less frequently in the experimental
facility.

In addition, the implementation of the program

was inexpensive, while the dollar savings gained from the
overall improvement in vehicular safety were about $28,129.

16

The researchers conclude their study with the challenge for
future research in the comparison of the relative efficacy
of outcome feedback versus behavioral feedback in the area
of safety performance.
Haynes, Pine, and Fitch (1982) also studied the use of
outcome feedback.

However, in addition, they utilized team

competition and incentives.

Their study evaluated the

effectiveness of a researcher-created intervention package
intended to reduce the accident rate of an urban mass
transit operation.
accident costs.

This operation was experiencing rising

The authors developed an intervention

package with three parts:

1) performance feedback, in terms

of number of accidents, 2) team competition, where teams
accrued points based on accident rates, and 3) incentives.
The program was conducted during an 18 week period using the
incentives.

Data was also collected for an 18 week period

after the completion of the incentive program.

The

experimental group reduced their accident rate 24.9% per 100
operators during the incentive period.

In the following

period, the numbers were non-significant.

Because this

study was conducted during an unusually severe winter, the
use of a control group allowed the results to be evaluated
independent of the changes in weather.

This study was

unable to measure unsafe driving behavior, due to the
logistics of vehicles, drivers, and their routes.

The

authors concluded that the combination of performance
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feedback, team competition, and inexpensive incentives
support a reduction in the experimental group's accident
rate.

In terms of cost, they concluded that the

relationship between monies spent on incentives, versus
monies spent on average accident claim settlement costs, was
cost effective.

They write:

"The use of low cost

contingent monetary incentives in conjunction with other
reinforcers such as feedback and competition can be
justified based on cost effectiveness alone" (Haynes et al.,
1982, p. 415).
While all of the programs claimed to be successful,
there still remains a question as to the causal relationship
between the lowered accident rates and the feedback and
incentives.

In the Haynes et. al study, there is the

additional question as to whether the feedback, team
competition, and incentives all played an equal part in the
result.

The next section reviews the use of incentives on

their own to inspire the desired results, and reviews a
study in which safety posters alone are used to increase
hazard awareness.
Incentives and Safety Posters
Another study of the use of incentives to improve
safety performance was completed by Fox, Hopkins, and Anger
{1987).

The study was conducted at two open pit mines, and

ran for 12 years at one site, and over 11 years at the
other.

Tokens were awarded to all employees each month for
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1) not suffering a lost time injury or injury with
physician's care, 2) if all the workers under one supervisor
did not suffer lost time or physician-treated injury, 3) for
safety suggestions, preventative acts, and miscellaneous
actions recognized by the safety committee.

In addition,

stamps were withheld based on the length of time missed from
work, and none of the group members could receive any tokens
until the injured employee returned to work.

The failure to

report accidents and damage to equipment also resulted in
the loss of tokens.

The tokens were in the form of trading

stamps that could be exchanged at stores or a catalog for a
wide range of merchandise, such as household appliances.
The researchers write:

"All of the results are strong

evidence that behavioral programs can be faithfully
administered and that the effects of those programs can be
maintained for extensive periods of time" (Fox et al., 1987,
p. 222).

They report a substantial decrease in the number

of days lost to accidents during the first year of the
program.

By the end of the second year, the number of lost-

time injuries ran about 15% of the average baseline rates at
one location, and at 32% of the average baseline rate at the
other location.

In terms of the costs of accidents and

injuries, both locations saw decreases of approximately 90%:
from $294,000 to $29,000 at location one, and from $367,696
to $38,972 at the other.

The cost ratios of dollars saved

to dollars spent on the program ranged from 18.1 to 27.8,
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and 12.9 to 20.7 at the two locations, adjusted for
inflation and hours worked.

In addition, the mine managers

suggested that the token program also increased the morale
of the staff at both locations.
While contests may promote an increase in the desired
behavior, there are also possible negative side effects that
can result.

Hampton (1970) focuses on the negative affects

that any type of contest can cause within an organization.
Hampton researched eight contests of eight companies in
diverse industries.

He found that all the contests were

successful in meeting their purpose, but additionally, that
all had side effects.

The majority of the behavioral side

effects fall into three classes.

Neglect occurs when a

contest is so successful that efforts are drawn away from
routine concerns.

The second side effect is conflict, which

can occur between superiors and subordinates, those in
lateral or work-flow relations, or between salesman and
customers.

The last side effect is that of dishonesty, or

abuse of the standards.

The study also reveled three

sources for the side effects:

defective design, defective

implementation, and employee values.

"The systemic effects

of contests on organizational behavior are, therefore, more
diverse than the contest objectives, but contest
administrators look for and measure results only in terms of
contest objectives" (Hampton, 1970, p. 86).

To avoid this

situation, before implementation of a contest, a company
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needs to ask "Is what the contest does for the company worth
what it does to it?" (Hampton, 1970, p. 86).
Another popular process to promote safety is the use of
safety posters.

These may be used with or without an

incentive program.

In an European study, the use of safety

posters was studied to determine whether hazard
consciousness among workers could be significantly enhanced
(Saarela, 1989).

The campaign materials were developed

after a safety analysis was completed on the number of
scaffold accidents within a shipyard in Finland.

The poster

campaign began with a training seminar for 10% of the
personnel.

Posters and handouts were then circulated and

posted throughout the department.

The design of the study

included pre- and post- campaign interviews and observation
sessions.

In addition, a before and after accident analysis

was completed.
The results demonstrated that workers were more
conscious of the hazards associated with scaffolds after the
campaign's conclusion.

All the employee recognized the

poster, while every fifth worker had heard his/her
supervisor discuss the kick-off training session material.
Observations, however, did produce continued unsafe
behaviors.

While the numbers of accidents did decrease, the

decrease actually followed a trend that had begun prior to
the study.

Overall, the researcher concluded that the

campaign was effective in enhancing hazard consciousness and
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that a written message was more effective than an oral
message.

The fact that some improvement was noticed in work

practices, yet that the campaign's effect was modest is
supported by other studies that demonstrate that
informational safety campaigns are seldom strong enough to
provide outstanding improvements.

"Awareness of hazards

cannot alone ensue safety" (Saarela, 1989, p. 184).
While safety posters themselves may not be sufficient
to change all behaviors to be more safe, perhaps when
combined with an incentive program success will follow.

The

Fox et. al study is especially significant in the field of
safety in that it was conducted for such a long period of
time with such success.

However, the Hampton (1970) review

demonstrates that careful preparation and implementation is
necessary to ensure that an incentive program provides
strong enough results to override any negative side effects.
The use of incentives and safety posters provide companies
with some options when designing a safety program.

With any

program, however, a careful review of the organization's
culture is necessary to best tailor the program for success.
Employee's attitudes and their perception of hazards are
important issues to address when designing a safety program.
The next section reviews studies conducted on these two
topics.
Employee Attitudes and Fear Messages
In a study of an European company, Cox and Cox (1991)
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found that "safety cultures reflect attitudes, beliefs,
perceptions and values that employees share in relation to
safety" (1991, p. 93).

The company studied was very safety

conscious and applied four principles:

1) that all

accidents are preventable, 2) safety is a line management
responsibility, 3) safety is a condition of employment, and
4) management is responsible for safety of its employees.
The study itself was set up as a program to further develop
the safety culture.
distributed.

A questionnaire was developed, and

Of 821 respondents, there were 630 complete

cases for factor analysis.

The resulting data described

five factors which support employee attitudes to safety:
1) effectiveness of arrangements for safety, 2) individual
responsibility, 3) personal skepticism, 4) safeness of work
environment, and 5) personal immunity.

In conclusion, the

researchers advise that expression of individual
responsibility is rewarded, and that companies should build
on employees knowledge and positive evaluation of
arrangements for safety and safeness of the work
environment.

In addition, it is necessary to change

unconstructive beliefs about personal immunity, and to
reduce skepticism over safety.
Goldberg, Dar-El, and Rubin (1989) tested their ideas
about the role that workers' perception of threat plays in
choice of behaviors.

Beginning their study, they looked to

see what promotes a worker to become fatalistic, and what
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would promote an employee's willingness to become
participative in promoting safety.

The results of the study

found that workers often overstate the potential dangerous
conditions they work in.

The study confirmed that this

perceived threat did move the employee in one of the two
ways, but was inconclusive as to how to move them toward
participation, rather than a fatalistic attitude.
conclude:

They

"the primary task for management in dealing with

many organizational maladies may be to find ways to channel
worker reactions away from withdrawal, and instead aim for
collective security within participative activities"
(Goldberg et al., 1989, p. 120).
Both of these studies enhance the field of safety, as
well as demonstrate that safety is a complex issue.
&

The Cox

Cox study provides employers with the variables that

affect employees' attitudes toward safety, yet does so
within an environment which had a history of promoting
safety.

Further study would be needed to compare these

perceptions to those of employees from organizations that
did not have such a history.

In addition, study is needed

to further define what motivates an employee to become more
safety-confident rather than fatalistic.

While the

literature in these areas is limited, there is an array of
literature on the topic of organizational behavior
management.

The next section will discuss the many recent

studies available in this area.
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Organizational Behavior Management
Even when a employee recognizes a safety hazard, he/she
still has a choice of behaviors or actions within that area
of safety.

Geller (1989) argues that motivating people in

the area of prevention is difficult, because in many cases,
such as smoking, the unsafe act is followed by immediate
pleasure, with the potential negative factor, such as
cancer, being a distant possibility.

Geller focuses solely

on the application of organizational behavior management
(OBM) on occupational safety in his 1989 study.

In terms of

preventing occupational accidents, one should look at the
specific completed behaviors of those involved, and the
behaviors that did not occur, since they could have
prevented the accident.

Findings from this study suggest

that behavior modification can be applied to promote the use
of safe behaviors, and to discourage the use of the unsafe
behaviors.

Geller has designed a program of OBM within the

acronym of DO RITE:
1.

Define the target behavior.

2.

Observe the target behavior.

3.

Record the observations.

4.

Intervene to increase the occurrence of desired

behavior.
5.

Test the impact of behavior change strategies ....

6.

Evaluate whether to continue, refine, or

discontinue the intervention program by examining
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graphic displays of the target behavior(s) during
baseline, intervention, and withdrawal phases.

(Geller,

1989, pp. 183-185).

Geller (1989) makes an important comment, that "safety must
not be considered a priority in an organization, because
priorities can be shifted according to the demand of other
priorities" (Geller, 1989, p. 185).

Rather, according to

Geller, safety needs to be built into the system.
Similarly, in a study by Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson
(1980), another example of an immediate reward following an
unsafe practice was found.

Workers who performed an unsafe

act were sometimes rewarded by completing their tasks more
quickly.

For this study, the authors defined safe behaviors

for four sections of a city's vehicle maintenance
department.

Observations of behaviors were listed under the

classifications of 1) proper use of equipment and tools,
2) use of safety equipment, 3) housekeeping and, 4) general
safety procedures.

These observations were made over a

period of 45 weeks, broken into periods of 1) baseline data,
2) training only, 3) training and feedback, 4) training only
a second time, and a final period of 5) training and
feedback.

While a slight increase of safe behavior was

found in each period of training, an even greater increase
was found during the training and feedback period.

Thus,

when the workers knew the level of their performance of safe
behaviors, they continued and increased that behavior.

The
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authors also found that the workers responded favorably to
the safety program, even starting an informal competition to
increase safe behaviors.
The pinpointing of which safe behaviors to measure can
play an important part in conducting a successful program.
Sulzer-Azaroff and Fellner (1984) propose that "establishing
criteria for using a more objective, valid, data-based
system for identifying targets of change probably would be
more cost effective and efficient over the long-term"
(Sulzer-Azaroff

&

Fellner, 1984, p. 55).

To do so, the

authors reviewed records, conducted interviews, observed
safety inspections, set priorities for items to be observed,
refined and clarified items, and developed a recording
system.

The authors compare this system to the use of

quality circles, in that input from workers, participative
decision-making, and small-group work can make this process
stronger.
Expanding upon the last study, Sulzer-Azaroff, Loafman,
Merante, Hlavacek (1990) took a previously developed injury
prevention model to test in a large industrial plant.

The

process they followed was to determine safe behaviors, make
observations, and then apply feedback, reinforcement, and
goal setting.

Target behaviors, called pinpoints, were set

for all levels of personnel involved in the program.

The

results showed a reduction in lost time accidents to almost
zero, and a large drop in OSHA recordable accidents.

The
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safety scores ranged from 90% to 100% for the three
departments that had previously had the highest injury rates
in the plant.

The authors observed:

"workers comments were

reported to be overwhelmingly positive.

They often inquired

about their safety performance prior to formal posting and
asked what they could do to improve it" (Sulzer-Azaroff et
al., 1990, p. 118).

In addition, the company's safety

director commented that the design of this program fit the
company's need for a positive behavioral approach, in
contrast to a program focused on the negative goal of
accidents.
In another study on organizational behavior management,
Reber, Wallin, and Chhokar (1984) designed a three part
study based on Heinrich's (1959) theory that 88% of all
accidents are caused by unsafe acts.

To see if this three-

tiered approach could reduce accidents, they used an
observational checklist, goal setting and feedback, and a
multiple baseline design.

The results' negative correlation

"indicates that the higher the behavioral safety
performance, the lower the accident rate, thus furnishing an
indirect proof of the validity of the safety measurement
procedure" (p. 123).

The authors conclude that employees,

when provided with specific, achievable goals and feedback,
would follow behavioral safety rules.

The study also

demonstrated the cost savings involved in using a behavioral
safety program.

The cost of the program was $25,000, yet
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savings due to reduction of lost time accidents, and the
lowering of the company's accident insurance premiums were
estimated at approximately $120,000.
In another study, Reber and Wallin (1983) demonstrate
the direct relationship between behavioral measures of
safety and injury rates.

Since occupational accidents are

considered "rare" events, due to their infrequent occurrence
in relationship to the frequent occurrence of unsafe
behavior, the researchers looked at data over a period of
time.

They used baseline data to reflect past performance,

and found that departments with a higher level of
performance per the rules tended to have a lower incidence
rate, and vice versa.
Reber and Wallin stress the importance of knowledge of
results in their study published in 1984.

In this study,

they looked at the effects of knowledge of results (KR) and
goal setting on improving safety.

Using the same study of a

farm machinery manufacturer (Reber, Wallin, Chhokar, 1984)
they designed four phases:

1) baseline, 2) training only,

3) training and goal setting, and 4) training, goal setting
and knowledge of results.

The same safety goals were set

for each department, with all department supervisors in
agreement that they were difficult, but achievable.

During

the last phase, knowledge of results was provided to
employees up to two to four times a week.

The authors

conclude that knowledge of results was a key factor in
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increasing employees' safe behavior:

"although behavioral

safety performance did improve significantly after a goal
was assigned and apparently accepted, in general the goal
was not achieved until KR was provided" (Reber & Wallin,
1984, p. 556).

The authors proceed to hypothesize that

knowledge of results adds an extra incentive to increase the
use of safe behavior.

In conclusion, this study showed that

a behavioral safety program will be enhanced by the addition
of difficult, but achievable goals, and providing feedback,
so that employees know where they are in meeting those
goals.
To demonstrate further the importance of goals and
feedback to a behavioral safety program, Reber, Wallin, and
Chhokar (1990) conducted a study at a farm machinery
manufacturing plant using the three departments with the
most safety problems.

This project was designed to

replicate the 1984 study in another field setting.

The data

was collected via an observational checklist for 55 weeks,
resulting in a total of 167 observations.

The dependent

variables were the percentage of employees in each
department performing the job in a safe manner, and the
frequency of on the job injuries as defined by OSHA.

Once

again, the study incorporated a multiple baseline design
across departments, with the four periods of 1) baseline,
2) training only, 3) training and goal setting, and
4) training, goal setting, and knowledge of results (KR).
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The major finding of the study was that KR is a
beneficial for achievement of maximum performance when
specific, difficult, and achievable goals are set.

The

researchers found that behavioral safety performance did
improve significantly after the goal was assigned and
accepted, but that the goal was not consistently achieved
until KR was added.

KR and goal setting are more effective

in performance improvement than goal setting alone.
Lower accident rates, cost savings, and increased
employee acceptance and participation are the positive
results incurred from adoption of an organizational behavior
management approach to safety.

This approach is also

attractive in that it can be applied to different industries
and geographic regions as the studies demonstrate.

By

establishing the direct relation of unsafe behavior to
accident rates, these studies also provide the causal link
that many safety studies lack.

An underlying theme of these

programs lies in the importance of the employee acceptance
and participation of the programs.

Knowledge of results in

the Reber et. al study, and employee's acceptance and
participation cited in the Sulzer-Azaroff et al. study
support the recent management theory of employee
participation and empowerment.

The next section reviews a

study on how the quality of work life affects safety.
Quality of Worklife
In their study, Harshbarger and Rose (1991) began with
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the hypothesis that success in improving industrial safety
and reducing worker's compensation costs could be attained
by accomplishing two goals:

1) a reduction in accidents,

and 2) improvement in the quality of worklife.

Based upon

this, they developed a program for two corporations.
At company A, they visited plants and discussed the
safety performance with management.

They found that the

plants with the lower safety records were distinguished by
1) hazards took longer to remove or repair, 2) managers
describe workers as poor quality and not caring, and
3) workers described managers in the same terms.

The

researchers then selected the plant with the worst safety
record for their pilot program.

The first step was to

"shift the paradigm" (Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 136).
The managers and supervisors were taught to move from the
tradition of finding fault with employees and focusing on
accidents to instead, focusing their attention on competence
and safe performance.

Incentives were established for safe

performance, and feedback loops in the form of posters
displaying current safety performance were also utilized.
In addition, the plant began holding periodic meetings on
safety, and safe performance became part of the management
meetings as well as part of their evaluations.

The second

step of the program was to "Build the community"
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 136).

A safety committee was

empowered and listened to, while social networks were
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developed via work groups.

Employees who had repeated lost

time injuries were counseled, re-trained, and shifted to
less risky assignments.

The result of this program was that

within 60 days the number of lost time accidents dropped to
zero and stayed at zero for nine months.
The researchers used the same evaluation procedures at
company B, and found the same results.

At this location

they developed a four component program.
parts were the same as at Company A:

The first two

1) Shift the paradigm

and 2) Build the community.

Step 3 was "Manage the crisis

of an accident" (Harshbarger

&

Rose, 1991, p. 139).

This

meant that management changed their view of an accident as a
disruption in work performance and began to see it as a
crisis in the life of the employee and his/her work group.
This lead to rapid response, and the attempt to reduce the
accident severity via the use of support systems.

Quick

treatment, a prompt return-to-work, and outside
rehabilitation services were essential to meet these goals.
The final step was "Reinforce and maintain performance"
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 140).

Organizationally,

visible feedback loops such as posted results and active
reports were utilized in this step.

This program reduced

the lost time accidents by 87%, from 67 to only nine.

The

researchers feel that "the management practices portion of
the problem may be far larger than previously imagined"
(Harshbarger & Rose, 1991, p. 142).

They see safety and
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worker's compensation as a problem of choice.

Workers who

have accidents can unnecessarily choose the role of injured
or disabled employee, management can choose to ignore human
needs, and senior management can choose to make safety a
priority or to ignore it.
This appears to be the only study in this area of
quality of work life and safety, but perhaps it is just the
beginning.

Empowerment, quality circles, and total quality

management (TQM) are still relatively new theories, and
their applications to safety are beginning to come to light.
Chapter 6 addresses the area of TQM and safety, as well as
discusses companies that have successfully combined the two.
This literature review has reviewed the diverse approaches
to safety that exist.

Incentives, posters, knowledge of

employees' attitudes and perceptions, and organizational
behavior management are all tools that can be used to create
a safe environment.

The various program successes

demonstrate that different approaches can be successful in
different environments.

The next section reviews a study of

successful safety program characteristics.

This information

can be valuable in helping a company choose the right
approach to safety.

However, without the right support and

commitment, no program will be able to succeed.
Characteristics of Successful Safety Programs
In a further search to define the characteristics of
successful safety programs, Smith, Cohen, Cohen, and
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Cleveland (1978) conducted a companion study to a 1975 mailout questionnaire survey in which matched pairs of high and
low accident rate plants were compared.

In the second

study, a team of safety professionals visited seven pairs of
plants with two purposes.

"1) To evaluate and validate the

results of the earlier questionnaire study, and 2) to add to
the knowledge gained from that study by looking at safety
program features in more detail and by examining features
that could not be examined in a questionnaire" (Smith et
al., 1978, p. 5).
Information was collected via interviews with all
levels of management and workers, and from plant walkthroughs and observation.

The program areas of management

complexity, management commitment, management involvement,
financial commitment, safety policy statement, safety rules,
safety staff, management efficiency, and plant solvency were
rated on a scale of one (very poor) to seven (excellent).
The data verified the 1975 questionnaire study and indicated
differences in the practices of the high and low accident
rate plants in several areas.
The researchers found that the low accident rate plants
showed greater management commitment to safety and had more
extensive or comprehensive employee relations programs.
Managers had greater one to one interaction with employees,
and more sophisticated selection techniques were also used
at the low accident rate plants.

In addition, those plants
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also had higher financial stability and solvency, in that
they appeared to be more efficient, and conformed to good
management procedures.

Both types of plants received

comparable ratings in terms of buildings and equipment, yet
the low accident rate plants had better housekeeping
practices.
In regards to safety program characteristics, more high
accident rate plants had specific personnel in safety
spending more time on safety matters, as well as a higher
level of employee participation on safety committees.

The

low accident rate plants more often used lead workers to
train new employees in safety while high accident rate
plants more often used supervisors or training personnel in
that function.
training.

Both types of plants used on-the-job

The low accident rate plants had more formal

hazard inspection procedures yet neither used very formal
procedures.

There was little follow-up as to whether

spotted hazards were taken care of.

In terms of safety

policy, accident investigations, and record-keeping all of
the plants were rated the same.

Few plants investigated

more than accidents with serious injuries.
In summary, the low accident rate plants had greater
management commitment to safety, with active involvement of
management in the safety program being the key to promoting
safety.

The low accident rate plants' management dealt with

employees on a human level.

They had a higher regard for
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employees, treated employees with respect and sympathy.
There was lots of communication between management and
employees, more frequent and positive contacts between
management and employees, and management appeared closer to
employees in that they knew the names of the employees.

In

addition, the low accident rate plants had more employee
relations programs such as training, affirmative action, and
benefits.

The researcher concluded that the low accident

rate plants have better safety performance because they have
better core workforces, or that they have better core
workforces because they have better work conditions,
employee selection techniques, and better management styles.
The researchers did find two areas of safety that
lacked sufficient attention.

Few of either types of plants

offered formal safety training, an area that needed
improvement.

In addition, the researchers advise "whatever

the case, the failure to investigate non lost-time accidents
and incidents was a major deficiency in the safety programs
of both the low and high accident rate plants studied"
(Smith et al., 1978, p. 14).
Conclusion
The purpose of this literature review is to provide an
overview of the various approaches to safety.

The first

step in achieving a safe environment, as per Smith et al.,
1978, is to provide a good working environment, with
management commitment, communication, and solid employee
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relations.

In addition, training and accident investigation

are also needed.

From this point, perhaps it is best to

review the organizational culture and resources, in deciding
whether to use incentives, posters, fear messages, or
organizational behavior management.

A program well

prepared, implemented, and evaluated on effectiveness seems
to be the most conducive way towards a safe work
environment.

CHAPTER 4
PARADIGM SHIFT
Safety is not a resource; it is not an influence; it is
not a procedure; and it certainly is not a program.
Rather, safety is a state of mind, an atmosphere that
must become an integral part of each and every
procedure that the company has (Petersen, 1988,
p. 91).

Incident-Focused Safety Management
For many companies, the approach to a safer work place
has been founded on an incident-focused approach to safety.
This type of approach is based on three assumptions:
1) Employee commitment and awareness can be gained via
pledges, campaigns, and incentives, 2) Individual
responsibility, commitment and awareness will result in safe
behavior and few incidents, and 3) Accident rates are valid
indicators of safe performance (Dial, 1992, p.37).

However,

there are several problems with these assumptions.

One

problem is that responsibility is confused with culpability.
Awareness of a hazard does not necessarily result in a
change of behavior.

Additionally, the use of incentive

programs assume that the work environment is supportive of
safety, and that safety is not part of the organization's
38

39
culture.

Dial (1992) notes, "In fact, working safely is so

far outside the culture that management is willing to tender
superfluous rewards in an attempt to coax employees to work
safely" (p. 38).

The use of incentives can also lead to a

dependency on them.

To continue promoting safety, bigger

and better incentives must be used.

In addition, when

incident-focused, management assumes that the only obstacle
to safety is an employee's lack of care and caution.

If

employees would only set their minds to avoid all exposure,
zero incidents would occur.

This mindset ignores all of the

possible system errors that cause employees to perform
unsafe behaviors.
Another major problem with using the incident-focus
approach to safety is that for many organizations, their
accident rates only reflect random fluctuations (Dial, 1992,
p. 39).

Often, an organization will meet their goal in

reducing accidents, but as soon as the resources once
applied to safety are redirected, the numbers of incidents
rise again.

A basic safety axiom is that is impossible to

eliminate all accidents (Gilmore, 1970).

If the capability

of an accident exists, mathematical probability will direct
the frequency.

A safe organization should set the goal of

reducing the probability of accidents to occur.
Even if an organization's incident rate is
statistically valid, it still only provides after-the-fact
information.

Mere review of the numbers of accidents does
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not define the internal problems that caused them.

If an

organization sets its safety goal at zero incidents, their
focus will be on the outcome, not on the steps toward
safety.

Instead, organizations need to work toward

continuous safety improvement.

The first step is to develop

an organizational culture that values safety.

Top

management needs to be transformed, so that everyone truly
believes in safety.

Then, by using a behavior based safety

process, the barriers to safety can be overcome.
Paradigm Shift
To maximize safety, a paradigm shift must occur.

The

new way to look at safety is that unsafe acts and
conditions, and the resulting accidents and injuries, are
all symptoms of something wrong with the management system
(Ezell, 1992, p. 152).

Safety needs to be seen as an

operational strategy, not as a social strategy.

Charles

Ezell, a safety director, links safety to Philip Crosby's
Absolutes of Quality Management (1984).
principles of total safety management:

Ezell suggest three
1)

management must

be a vital part of the total safety organization,
2) management must be held accountable for safety
performance, and 3) management must be a part of accident
causation sequence (Ezell, 1992, p. 152).
Another safety researcher, Thomas Krause, writes
"safety and quality are two sides of the same coin" (Krause,
1993, p. 47).

Krause defines the ordinary Safety Cycle:
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1) low safety performance leads to 2) high quality attention
to safety leading to 3) improved safety performance leading
to 4) scarce resources moved elsewhere leading to 1) low
safety performance (Krause, 1993, p. 48).
Statistical Process Control {SPC)
Just as in quality, the use of statistical process
control can be applied to safety.

In SPC terms, upstream

factors are processes such as practice, research, or hard
work, while downstream factors are the results such as
skill, new product, or better pay.

Traditional safety

programs measure the downstream factors of accident rates.
In SPC management, the measurement of the upstream factors,
in this case unsafe behaviors, are the key to safety.

These

upstream factors are predictive of the defects in the
system.
In the old systems of safety, "in part because the
linkage is indirect between the upstream and downstream
factors of safety performance, management does not know what
to pay attention to and, therefore, tends to overreact to
random variability in accident rates" (Krause, 1993, p. 48).
This focus on the accident rates bypasses the possible
problems of exposure, the management system, the culture,
and ignores how the management system directly affects
employee behavior.

Meanwhile, the blame placed on the

employee often results in employee resentment and
resistance.

The behavior-based approach to safety coincides
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with Deming's point that management has the responsibility
to fix management programs.

Quality and safety are linked

together.
Deming's 14 Points
Another safety researcher, Stephen Motzko (1989) has
applied Deming's 14 Points of Quality (1986) to safety (see
table 1).

The first point can be translated into improving

safety and employee health.

Motzko challenges safety

professionals in point two to move from accident reduction
and common sense programs to finding new approaches for the
same problems.

In point three, he advises that program

audits be stopped, in that they audit compliance, but do
nothing to help the system.

In regards to the fourth point,

companies can minimize total cost by working with a single
supplier.

Safety is usually the last program to receive

money, and many times purchase decisions are made on the
basis of cost alone.

Investment in good equipment pays off

in the long run.
In order to meet point five, safety must be looked at
as a process, not just in terms of end results.
refers to the need for training.

Point six

Not only must the amount

of training be increased, but training must be done in terms
of skill development.

The appropriate training techniques

must be used for different types of training, and different
types of employees.

In regards to point seven, it is

important to remember to help people to be more safe, not
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just merely rate them.

One of Deming's strongest points is

TABLE 1
DEMING'S 14 POINTS APPLIED TO SAFETY
1.

Create constancy of purpose for improvement of
product and service.

2.

Adopt the new philosophy.

3.

Cease dependence on inspection to achieve quality.

4.
5.

End the practice of awarding business on the basis
of price tag alone.
Improve constantly and forever every process for
planning, production and service.

6.

Institute training on the job.

7.

Adopt and institute leadership.

8.

Drive out fear.

9.

Break down barriers between staff areas.

10.

Eliminate slogans, exhortations, and targets for
the work force.

11.

Eliminate numerical quotas for the work force and
numerical goals for management.

12.

Remove barriers that rob people of pride of
workmanship. Eliminate the annual rating or merit
system.

13.

Institute a vigorous program of education and selfimprovement for everyone.

Put everybody in the company to work to accomplish
the transformation.
Source:
Stephen M. Motzko, "Variation, system improvement,
and safety management," 1989, pp.17-20.
14.

number eight, which is to drive out fear.

This includes the

fear of reporting incidents, and the fear of speaking up
about hazards and system problems.

In order to achieve the
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ninth point, safety must be for everyone, and communication
and team work are essential.

The tenth point often confuses

many companies who have made slogans, exhortations, and goals
a common practice.

However,

if these items are used in an

environment that does not support them,

they only lead to

employee frustration.
Deming's 11th point has always created much controversy,
since numerical quotas are firmly set into the structure of
many American businesses.

However numerical measures need to

be statistically significant and consistently applied and
interpreted.

If they are not handled properly, it is better

to delete them.
that

many

The 12th point has also caused debate,

companies

can

performance appraisals.
points

out that

not

comprehend

a

world

in

without

This point applied to safety merely

rewarding

individuals

accident competition can create a

or departments

for

destructive atmosphere,

since many factors of safety are usually out of the employees'
control.

The last two points highlight the need for employees

to be developed and challenged, and that everybody needs to be
working for safety.
Crosby's Quality Program
Philip Crosby, another quality spokesperson, has a list
of eight quality improvement concepts which can be applied to
a behavior-based safety program.
Just

as

the

goal

of

quality

is

to

minimize

the

variability of the quality of the product, the goal of safety
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is to minimize the frequency and severity of incidents and
accidents.

By using the indicators of accident frequency,

TABLE 2
CROSBY'S EIGHT QUALITY CONCEPTS APPLIED TO SAFETY

Constancy of purpose.

1.

2.

Process, not program.

3.

Do it right the first time.

4.

Don't blame the employee.
Specify standards in operational terms.

5.
6.

Use measurement of upstream factors to assess
performance.

7.

Improve process, not downstream results.

Use statistical techniques to distinguish variation
due to common cause from variation due to special
causes.
.
Source:
Thomas R. Krause, John H. Hidley, & Stanley J.
Hodson, "Measuring safety performance: The process approach, "
1991, p. 50.
8.

frequency of observation, the percentage of actions that rate
as

safety-related

safe,

maintenance

information,

and

involvement indicators and surveys, organizations can make the
timely changes necessary to management systems in order to
eliminate unsafe behaviors.

As the number of unsafe behavior

incidents decreases, so will the probability of accidents.
Companies Who Have Achieved Safety Improvement
DuPont
Passion
safety.

for

is known

for

Excellence

The

authors

its

safety culture.

cited

DuPont

for

write

"Dupont's

its
safety

In 1985 A
approach

to

record

is
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seventeen times better than the chemical industry average, and
sixty-eight
(Peters

&

times

better

than

Austin, 1985, p. 282) .

is a part of the culture,
company.

manufacturing

as

a

whole"

This concentration on safety

grounded in the history of the

Management is held accountable for safety.

One

manager stated "'If I had to choose between losing a major
account and taking a minor on-the-job lost-time accident, it
would be easy.
&

Austin,

I'd prefer the loss of the account'" (Peters

1985, p. 283).

From the top down,

integral part of the culture.

safety is an

While implementing a quality

program, DuPont has kept safety out of it, because they see
safety as too important to be part of a "program."
DuPont's
company itself.
a

DuPont

focus

on

safety has

spread

outside

of

the

Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) selected

Company

safety

seminar

to

begin

their

work

on

improving safety within their Transmission and Distribution
Department (Donovan, 1989, p. 80).

DuPont consultants helped

PECO tailor the DuPont safety seminar to fit PECO's needs.
The seminar was then held for more than 650 management level
employees.

From there, PECO used field personnel as course

trainers, who then went out and taught seminars covering how
to recognize unsafe acts and conditions, as well as safety
observation techniques.

In addition, safety became the first

item of business at staff meetings.
attitude of getting the

job done

Most importantly, the
quickly has

allowing enough time to do a job safely.

changed to

PECO began to use
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prizes and recognition for safety awareness and attitude, as
well as completion of safety goals.

The company looks at

DuPont's program as an approach to a

safety culture,

one

" ... which requires constant reinforcement and a continuing
demonstration of company commitment" (Donovan, 1989, p. 81).
Another company who utilizes a safety program from DuPont
is Florida Power and Light.

S.T.O.P.,

or Safety Training

Observation

employees

to

dangerous

Program,

situations.

Florida Power

&

trains

Before

spot

implementing

this

potential
program,

Light would classify injuries by categories,

and have appropriate training, such as back injury prevention
training.
causes.

This approach never really looked at the root
By using the S.T.O.P. program, and by developing a

safety management protocol, with procedures and checks at all
levels, the company was able to see improvement in the number
of lost time accidents and doctor-treated cases.
an

increase

in

the

number

of

reported

In addition,

unsafe

acts

and

conditions demonstrates that safety is being taken seriously.
Florida Power & Light is known for being a leader in the
area of total quality management, as a winner of the Deming
Award.

In addition to the use of the DuPont safety program,

the application of TQM principles to safety has also helped
the company to achieve a low safety record.

In the West Palm

Beach district, a team began working on employee safety in
1989.

While analyzing doctor-treated cases, they found that

of 19 total cases, 15 were wounds.

Of these cases, ten were

48

due to dog bites.

The team set a target goal for zero and

then brain-stormed reasons for dog-bites.

They

compared

their list to a survey of the ten cases to find the root
causes.

As a result, all meter readers were told that all

dogs are a risk.

A plastic meter reading card was created so

that if the customer did not secure their dog, the customer
could take the reading using the plastic card.

The team then

set up an action plan and timetable to put the new system in
place.

In April of 1989,

the team reviewed the accident

rates, and found five new dog bite cases.

After analysis of

those cases, the team made modifications.

For example, they

discovered that due to the size of the cards, the readers were
not always carrying them.

The cards were then modified to

fold in half, in order to fit easily into a pocket.

Again,

while all accidents are not preventable, by searching for root
causes,

the

probability

of

accidents

can

be

severely

decreased, resulting in a much safer environment.
In

1991,

DuPont

began

a

major

restructuring

which

resulted in almost one-half of the company's reporting levels
being eliminated.

As a

result,

the

65 employees of the

corporate safety and health department were replaced with the
SHE

(Safety,

Health,

and Environmental)

With only half the original staffing,
continue

networks

Excellence Center.
the center works to

and partnerships to help

safety (LaBar, 1993, p. 28).

DuPont manage

By keeping their commitment to

safety, DuPont has demonstrated that safety can be streamlined
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and downsized like any other part of the business.
Another chemical company, Dow Chemical Company is working
to

achieve

better

safety

rates

while

at

the

same

reducing safety staffing levels 25 percent by 1997
1993,

p.

28).

To

do

so,

they

created

the

Dow

time,
(LaBar,
Safety

Improvement System, which identifies ten key elements of a
safety program, and 13 programs of emphasis for the company.
The

corporate

director

for

safety,

loss

prevention,

and

security, John Oldner, attributes the emphasis on continuous
improvement as an important reason why safety performance has
improved while the staffing levels are reduced.
In another approach to safety,
Engineering

Department

began with

the Mecklenburg County
a

survey

of

employees'

attitudes, opinions, and morale as a reaction to a costly year
of work-related injuries.

As a result, they discovered that

employees were frustrated

by department hierarchy,

wanted

input in decision making, participation in problem solving,
and recognition for good performance.

From 1985 until 1990

they developed a quality control program, employee suggestion
program, recognition programs, and a team safety program.

For

the team safety program, management began with a analysis of
the most hazardous areas.
those

areas,

and

analyzed

They then formed work groups in
their

accidents.

Management

concluded that unsafe behaviors caused most of the accidents.
A program was then developed where employees worked as a team
to

remove

the

safety

problems,

incentives

were

awarded
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immediately, and employees were helped to see the impact of
their unsafe behavior.

Each team was to be rewarded based on

its total safety performance.

The pilot test conducted in one

section of the department brought immediate results.

However,

when management expanded the team program to another section,
they discovered that the program as is did not transfer well.
In the second group tested, the organizational culture of the
section was not as conducive for the team concept.

As a

result, management let the employees of that section re-design
the teams.
and

This reduced a lot of resistance to the program,

eventually

resulted

in

success.

The

engineering

department summarized the necessary ingredients to their team
safety program as 1) positive awards,

2)

team competition,

team recognition, team rewards, and team peer pressure, and
3) employee input (Lanier, Jr., 1992, pp.22-25).
In

1983,

when

the

Japanese

company,

Bridgestone

Corporation bought Firestone's LaVergne plant,

the

injury

incidence rate was rising while production and employment were
declining.

However,

Bridgestone was

able

to

turn

these

figures around through the use of employee involvement.
first

step

employees.

was

for

the

company

to

begin

listening

The
to

Quality circles were formed and named the Employee

Involvement Group

(EIG).

Due to the employee improvement

suggestions from these groups,

incident rates dropped over

five years from 11.8 per 200,000 work hours to 2.2 in 1986.
The Safety Director said: "'I think the EIG's have addressed
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some things that nobody else would have seen.
biggest function.
or better'"

That is their

They know the equipment as well as anybody,

(LaBar,

1989,

p.

103) .

In

addition

to

the

employee involvement groups, the plant also utilizes a safety
committee,

extensive training

for

departmental safety meetings.

new hires,

Again,

integral part of the work life,

and monthly

by making safety an

and by utilizing employee

involvement, companies can see an incredible turn around of
safety statistics.
Another chemical company, Occidental Chemical, began in
1983 to build a new safety culture.

The new president and

CEO, J. Roger Hirl decided to use the company's safety record
to measure success.
success

in

other

"Safety progress ... ought to coincide with
aspects

of

the

business

like

quality,

customer satisfaction, and productivity" (Smith, 1992, p. 65).
By focusing on the safety process, and how safety impacts on
the other parts of the business, and vice versa, Occidental
began

promoting

Productivity

=

a

safety

culture.

"Safety

+ Quality +

The Formula for Success" was adopted as a

manufacturing slogan in 1985.
safety meetings,

Along the way, employee-run

safety committees,

and employee-conducted

tours for visitors and clients all became a part of the safety
culture.

When Occidental began their TQM program "Oxy Quality

Plus," the director of quality management stated that the
safety program's use of employee involvement, training, and
charting performance assisted in the implementation of the
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quality program.

"Like quality ... safety

is

a

continuous

process of improvement" (Smith, p.66).
In 1987,

Occidental began work on a Safety Congress,

which took two years to design.

In 1989, participants of all

of the divisions of the company met to list their safety
concerns.

The

employee

and

management

lists

were

then

combined, prioritized, and the top 19 ideas were analyzed by
teams.

At

the

end

of

the

presentations to the group.

Congress,

each

team

made

Because of the commitment to

safety, honesty was a vital part of the Congress.

At one

point, during a discussion, one employee stated there were
times when production came before safety.

When management

questioned the group for specific examples, other employees
spoke up and provided them.

Management listened and believed.

After the Safety Congress, the participants returned to their
own locations,

and were able to work on their individual

plant's safety programs with the many new ideas shared at the
Congress.

In another big step toward safety, Occidental has

become an OSHA Voluntary Protection Program participant.

Five

worksites have earned OSHA star recognition, which means they
have safety and health programs in excess of OSHA standards,
and better than average incidence rates.
the

program

to

help

get

national

The company joined

recognition

for

their

employees who make safety a part of the culture.
In 1988,

the Delaware City plant of Georgia Gulf,

a

producer of PVC had the worst safety record in the company.
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As a result, they created a safety process named H.E.A.D. (use
your HEAD to Erase All Dangers).

In 1988 the safety steering

committee analyzed three years of accident reports.

They

discovered that over 30% of accidents in one area originated
from one task; the opening and closing of valves.

They found

that the root problem was that the valves were difficult to
open.

The committee also found that 84% of hand injuries were

due to a failure to wear proper equipment.

As a result, the

committee began observing and giving feedback on the use of
equipment.

In

addition,

management

made

sure

that

good

equipment was provided and that the valves were standardized.
After the implementation of the HEAD program, the plant only
experienced one valve incident.
Georgia Gulf also recognizes the link between safety and
quality.

"Safety performance is trending toward continuous

improvement.

And along with that trend in safety has come

improvement with quality" (Krause, 1993, p. 53).

The plant

discovered that when they keep regular sampling of the work
force behavior and condition, quality is high.
just before their injury rates go up.
the

safety process

outstanding

Quality slips

Another side benefit of

is that the plant has won awards

environmental

performance.

In

addition,

for
the

company now looks at the safety programs of its suppliers.
Once quality and safety becomes an integral part of a company,
it begins a ripple effect.

Suppliers are the next step in the

both the quality and safety chain.
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Another company which links quality and safety is Unocal.
In 1984, Unocal began using Crosby's quality theories.

In

1988, after a major explosion and fire at one of their plants
which

resulted

in

the

death

of

reviewed their safety program.

an

employee,

the

company

During the course of the

review, Unocal realized they could apply quality principles to
safety.

The Safety Improvement Process (SIP) has four safety

absolutes:

1) Conformance to requirements,

look at root causes, not after the fact,

2) Prevention--

3)

Zero Defects--

which represents the goal of continuous improvement to strive
for,

and 4)

Cost of Safety--the company needs to know the

total costs of safety to help in prioritizing (Minter, 1991,
p. 47).

After establishing the Four Absolutes of Safety, Unocal
surveyed their employees about the current safety program.
safety council developed a mission statement,

A

and set up a

committee to develop a cohesive safety program and standards.
The safety program was categorized into eight areas:
1) Procedures and Standards, 2) Reporting Responsibility,
3) Safety Equipment, 4) Training and Communications,
5) Maintenance and Inspection 6) Audits, 7) Recognition, and
8) Emergency Responses.

The committee then developed a two

volume set of safety regulations and procedures for the total
company, which is subject to annual reviews.

(Minter, 1991,

p. 48).

Unocal found that the biggest challenge in developing the

55
SIP was changing peoples' attitudes.

The company was able to

do so through management commitment and leading by example.
At the corporate headquarters, 50% of staff meetings every two
weeks were spent reviewing accidents,
control.

to find the lack of

One senior vice president states:

"An accident

report is not a closed matter ... until the cause is rooted out
and proper controls are put in place to keep the same thing
from happening again"

(Kiesche,

1990,

p.

25).

Management

commitment was also demonstrated via capital expenditures for
supplies, for the program, and for training.
Training has played an important part in Unocal's safety
success.

In opening a new plant, "Unocal took the approach

that in teaching its new employees how to perform their jobs
correctly,

it

would

be

teaching

them

how

to

work

safely •.. safety is covered as one of the various requirements
of

performing

a

quality

job"

(Minter,

1991,

p.

49).

Contractors working on Unocal property are required to attend
a one and one-half hour course on Unocal safety procedures.
In

addition,

headquarters,

when

Unocal

opened

their

new

corporate

each employee had to attend safety training

before they could enter the new building (Kiesche, 1990,
p. 25).
Other important parts of Unocal's safety process include
the use of self audits.

In reporting, near misses and minor

injuries are considered just as important as major incidents.
In review of the minor injuries of truck drivers, the safety

56

council discovered that the company did not have a uniform
design standard for trucks.
trucks

were

outfitted,

Drivers, unfamiliar with how the

were

experiencing

burns,

pulled

muscles, or twisted ankles due to different equipment.

As a

result, Unocal required design standards to be met by truck
manufacturers, and began standard training on the use of new
equipment.

Unocal also believes in teamwork in safety.

They

share safety ideas and information with other members of the
Chemical

Manufacturing Association through

Responsible Care Program.

the

industry's

In summary of the total Safety

Improvement Process, however, Unocal has realized that "'You
can't manage the outcome; you have to manage the process' "
(Kiesche, 1990, p. 26).
In order to create a

safe working environment while

adapting to an extremely competitive, global and diverse work
place, companies need to stop being incident-focused.

Using

the tools of total quality management such as statistical
process

control,

management

commitment,

and

employee

involvement is one way for companies to achieve their safety
goals.

Safety and quality should not just be the current

buzzwords of a management fad.

Rather, both are necessary for

companies to survive successfully in this changing world.

CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN
Hypotheses
In

designing

the

research

project,

the

following

hypotheses were developed:
Hypothesis 1:

Incentive programs focused on accident

rates alone do not prevent accidents.
Hypothesis 2:

A safety program that directs attention to

sate behavior will help lower the number of accidents.

Upon review of the results of the research study, answers to
the

various

questions

will

provide

the

researcher

with

information regarding the following:
1.

Do

the

employees

understand

the

current

safety

program?
2.

How safe do employees feel in their jobs?

3.

How important is safety?

4.

What do employees feel help them in working safely?

5.

What kind of

impact,

in terms

of how well they

remember from year to year, does the safety program have
on employees?
This information can then be reviewed to help determine what
parts of the safety program are useful.

If the research

project supports the first hypothesis, that incentives based
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on accident rates alone do not prevent accidents, a company
will then know where not to spend their money.
hypothesis,

If the second

that safety programs focused directly on safe

behavior do result in a lower accident rate is supported,
companies will know where to best apply monies and action to
increase safety.

This knowledge will provide a solid stepping

stone in the construction of an effective safety program.
Research Procedure
The hypotheses will be tested by a collection of survey
data from all of the non-exempt employees of three divisions
of

a

publicly-held company.

The

company

is

a

warehouse

distribution operation which currently has a safety incentive
program in place, that awards for time without accidents.
Overview of Safety Program
For all three divisions, the current safety incentive
program was implemented in April 1989, the beginning of the
1990 fiscal year for the company.

At that time, employees

began to accumulate points for each month they went accident
free.
points

A "lost time" accident resulted in a greater loss of
than

treatment.

an

accident

that

only

resulted

in

medical

At the end of the fiscal year, each employee was

allowed to order a prize from a catalog utilizing the points
they earned for that year.

The selection of items included

jewelry, sport equipment, kitchen appliances, and electronics.
In fiscal year 1993 the program was expanded to also
award

points

based

on

employee

attendance

at

work

and
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attendance at safety meetings, in addition to the time without
Also,

accidents.

at the end of the year,

the accumulated

points were paid out in the form of a gift certificate for a
national retailer, instead of the use of the prize catalog.
An

employee who had no sick days,

attended every

safety

meeting, and had no accidents was eligible to earn 60 points,
which was then converted to a $60 gift certificate.
Although attendance at the monthly safety meeting was
only

awarded

in

Fiscal

Year

1993,

for

the

most

part,

attendance at the meetings was strongly recommended since the
beginning of the program.
part

of

the

corporate

Safety meetings were implemented as
safety

approximately 30 minutes,

program

in

1986.

Lasting

the meetings would cover topics

supplied by the corporate office.

Materials such as hand-

outs and video-tapes were often utilized.

Many topics were

repeated yearly, such as fire safety and tornado safety.

Some

months when no topic was provided, each division could then
create its own program.

In addition to covering the topic of

the month, the safety meetings were also utilized as a forum
for the local division to bring up safety issues specific to
their current needs, and for employees to raise any safety
concerns to be addressed by management and/or the safety
committee.
The safety committee was added to the company program in
1990.

Each division recruited volunteers to serve on the

committee.

Walk-throughs of the local plant to catch safety
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violations and/or potential problems, as well as identifying
educational
committee.

needs

are

the

main

responsibilities

of

the

Each division is allowed the autonomy to expand

the safety committee's responsibilities as need requires.
The safety incentive program, monthly safety meetings,
and the safety committee are the key components of the safety
program developed by the corporate office and implemented
company wide.

In addition, individual divisions were allowed

the autonomy to address safety in other ways if they felt the
need.

For example, in 1990 Division A held a couple drawings

for several $100 bills.

The names of all employees who had

been accident free for the specified time period were put into
a box, and several names were drawn.

This was done in an

attempt to highlight the rewards of being accident free, due
to a sharp increase in the number of accidents the previous
year.
Methodology
The

design

of this

study

includes

a

survey.

This

allowed for some degree of anonymity for those surveyed to
respond honestly on the issues of safety within their work
environment.

Three separate surveys were designed for this

study, in order to collect information directly from the nonexempt

employees,

the

management

staff

involved

in

the

administration of the program, and the accident statistics.
The first survey (see Appendix 1) is comprised of three
pages.

This questionnaire was distributed to all of the non-

61

exempt employees that participate in the safety incentive
program.

Questions were asked to determine the employees'

perceptions of safety within the work environment.

Employees

were asked to respond to statements such as "I follow safety
procedures" and "Safety meetings provide me with information
that helps me

in my

job"

on a

four-point

scale.

The

employees were also asked whether they felt that certain
aspects of their work and the safety program were important to
the safety of the work environment.

On the last page of the

questionnaire, employees were asked to list the number of both
reported and non-reported accidents they had,

as well

as

demographic information.
At

the

employees were

end

of

asked

the

questionnaire,

questions

remembered parts of the

to

the

non-exempt

determine whether they

incentive program and the safety

meetings from year to year.

The final question, "What do you

think would make _____ a safer place to work?" was asked to
solicit additional ideas for the occupational safety program.
The second survey

( see Appendix 2)

was designed to

retrieve the archival data on OSHA 200 recordable accidents.
This information is necessary to determine if the accident
rates

of

the

three

divisions

had

declined

implementation of the safety incentive program.

after

the

Each division

was given one survey, and asked to fill in the number of OSHA
200 recordable accidents per month for the calendar years of
1988 through 1993.

In addition,

a miscellaneous comments
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section was given, in order to provide the opportunity for a
division to elaborate on any information they felt might have
affected the accident rates during this time period.
The final survey (see Appendix 3) was created to survey
the top three operation managers of each division.

All of

these managers share the responsibility for implementation and
monitoring of the division's safety program, as well as for
the safety meetings.

The managers were surveyed to confirm

that the safety program had been implemented per the corporate
guidelines for all of the years being reviewed.

In addition,

the managers were given the opportunity to list any factors
that they felt had an impact on the number of accidents.

The

managers were also asked whether they felt that the current
safety program should be continued.

The final question, "I

think we could improve safety by_ _ _ _ " was asked to solicit
their feelings on how to improve safety.
Sample Size and Response Demographics
Each month, every division of the company is required
to

hold

division,
period.

safety meetings.

Depending

on

the

size

two to three meetings are held within a

of

the

24 hour

All non-exempt employees are expected to attend the

safety meeting.

In fact, at the time of the survey, one of

the criteria to earn the safety incentive was attendance at
each month's safety meetings.

Because of management support,

all employees present at work on the day of the meeting do
attend.

Therefore,

the

sample

included

all

non-exempt
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employees of the three divisions employed the day of the
meeting.

The only employees missing would be those who were

sick or on vacation.

The resulting sample was 241 employees.

The breakdown was as

follows:

Division B, and 65 at Division

129 at Division A,

c.

47 at

The average age of the non-

exempt employees was 30, with 56% male and 44% female.
majority

(71%)

positions.

of

the

employees

surveyed

held

The

warehouse

Twelve percent were in office positions, such as

customer service and accounting.

The remaining 17% of the

employees reported to the inventory control, data processing,
facility

services,

departments.

quality

control,

and

transportation

Each division had both a day and night shift.

The average tenure of the employees was four and one-half
years, with three years being the average length of service in
the

current

position.

Of

the

three

Division A was the only union facility.

divisions

surveyed,

Forty percent of the

non-exempt employees surveyed were union, while 60% were nonunion.
No

demographics

were

collected

in

the

survey

operation managers, because of the small sample size.

of
Each

division had a distribution center manager, a day operations
manager, and a night operations manager.
surveyed at the three divisions,

Of the nine managers

eight of these managers

responded.
Procedures
The questionnaires were distributed to the non-exempt
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employees during each division's monthly safety meeting.
researcher was present at one of the divisions:

The

the meetings

at the other two divisions were led by a proctor.

At all

sites, the questionnaires were filled out on site during the
meeting,

collected immediately,

and sealed in an envelope.

The two divisions then mailed the envelopes directly to the
researcher.

In addition,

the top three operation managers

were surveyed via the separate questionnaire.

The management

questionnaires were left for the managers to complete during
that

same

week.

Self-addressed

stamped

envelopes

were

provided, so that the surveys could be mailed directly to the
researcher.
A written script and set of directions were mailed with
the surveys to the two divisions, so that the questionnaires
were presented and handled in the same manner at each site.
Confidentiality for each survey response was promised.

The

employees were informed that the envelope with the completed
surveys was to be sealed at the end of the meeting, and mailed
directly to the researcher.

No one from the company would

look at the individual responses, and the results were to be
reported in the aggregate to protect the confidentiality of
the responses.
Coding and entry of the survey results were done by the
researcher due to the small
processed

and

including

mean,

analyzed,
mode,

sample size.

using
and

SPSS PC.

standard

The data were
Basic

deviation

statistics
were

run.
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correlations among different demographic groups were also
reviewed.

Results

of

the

open-ended

questions

were

transcribed, and some are reported in the result section.
Variables
In

this

study

the

independent

variables

are

the

incentive program and safety meetings currently in place at
the company participating in the

study.

In the

current

program, all non-exempt employees receive a non-cash material
item upon completion of the designated time period without an
accident.

The type of incentive has changed throughout the

years of the program implementation.

Therefore,

data was

collected specific to each type of incentive used:

gift

certificate to a major retailer, and/or choice of products
from a catalog.
The dependent variable of this research is the number of
accidents.

This

will

be

defined

in

terms

of

accidents

recorded on the OSHA 200 Log, which are those accidents that
require medical attention (greater than first aid), or lost
time from work.

CHAPTER 6
RESEARCH RESULTS
Accident Rates
The number of accidents per month for each division can
be found on the OSHA 200 form.
federal law.

This document is required per

Reporting is done on a calendar year basis.

Table 3 reflects the OSHA recordable accident totals for the
three divisions together.

Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the number

of OSHA recordable accidents broken down by month for each
division for the calendar years of 1988-1993.

Overall,

there

of

was

recordable

a

significant

accidents

for

decline
the

in

the

three

implementation of the safety program:

number

divisions

since

OSHA
the

in 1988, the last year

before implementation of the safety incentive program, there
were 65 total accidents for all of the divisions.

In 1989 the

number of accidents increased to 79, but for each year after,
there was a steady decline in the number of accidents.
1993,

In

there were only 42 accidents recorded for the three

divisions.
When

the

number

of

accidents

is

examined

for

each

division separately, there is also a reduction in the number
of

accidents

throughout

implementation.

the

years

of

the

safety program

However, an erratic pattern of increases, as
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well as decreases emerge.

Division A, which is the largest of

the three divisions in terms of number of employees, is

TABLE 3
TOTAL OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS FOR 3 DIVISIONS
1993< .•·1992

1991

1990

1989

1

1.988

2

6

7

6

6

6

6

2

8

12

5

4

6

2

4

8

12

4

3

0

4

4

6

3

0

6

4

4

4

3

0

3

5

2

6

6

4

10

2

6

9

6

9

1

4

6

6

10

1

3

4

5

6

8

1

7

5

2

4

4

6

5

2

7

9

6

4

3

3

2

6

5

42

48

52

64

79

65

.
·.·.

May
I••• .

.:rune .•. ·.·

.....

··•

. July/
.

. ...

. .September
.· .. ·

·.

·•

.·... Decel!lbet'.<

the

most

erratic

accidents recorded.
to 46 in 1990.

of

the

three.

In

1988

there

were

27

This number increased to 38 in 1989, and

A decrease to 22 accidents in 1991 reflects

the year with the least nul!lber of accidents.

1992 reflects a

jump up to 36 accidents, and in 1993 there was another slight
decrease to 26 recordable accidents.
makes

it difficult

to

This erratic pattern

discern whether

or

not

the

program directly affected the number of accidents.

safety
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Of

the

three divisions,

Division

B demonstrates

the

greatest overall decrease in number of recordable accidents.
While there was

an

accidents from 1988
show a

large

increase

in the

(20) to 1989

decrease

in

number of recordable

(23), the following years

accidents.

In

1992

only

four

accidents occurred, and in 1993 that number increased only to
seven.

Overall, the decrease in the number of accidents was

greater than 50%, suggesting that the safety program

TABLE

4

DIVISION A OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS
·..

.•· ·. 1993

·...

..

May
June

1992

1991 . 1990

1989

1988

2

4

4

4

2

3

2

2

2

11

1

1

3

1

2

6

2

1

2

0

2

4

3

1

0

4

2

2

1

3

0

2

1

2

4

2

3

6

1

1

4

3

4

1

2

5

2

3

1

3

2

4

4

3

1

7

2

1

4

1

5

3

1

4

7

4

3

3

1

2

4

2

26

36

22

46

38

27

::;:

· .. ···

.Sep1:.entber.

October···
November
Oecember ·
Total

was successful in this division.
Division C also experienced a reduction of 50% in the
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number of recorded accidents,
pattern.
and

but also through an erratic

While only 18 accidents were recorded in both 1988

1989,

this

division experienced a

accidents in 1991.

peak number

of

22

A decrease in the number of accidents

brought the number down to nine in 1993.

Again, the decrease

in the number of accidents points to success of the safety
program.

However, the fact that of the years surveyed, this

division experienced the highest number of accidents in the
third year of the program's implementation casts some doubt as
the direct relationship between the program and the number of
accidents.
Of the three divisions, there appears to be no pattern
to the fluctuation in the number of recorded accidents that is
consistent

among

them.

This

inconsistency

suggests

the

possibilities of other factors affecting the accident rate, or
that the safety program itself did not affect the number of
accidents.

Division A experienced the greatest increase (14)

in accidents during the third year of the safety program, from
1991 to 1992, while their greatest decrease was from 1990 to
1991 (24).

This decrease could possibly be attributed to the

drawings for $100 bills utilized by only Division A.
B

saw

no

increase

in

recorded

accidents

Division

after

the

implementation of the safety incentive program, and had its
greatest decrease the next year,
seven.

1989 to 1990,

from 23 to

From 1990 to 1991 division c reported a 100% increase

in the number of accidents, and an even greater decrease the
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following year.
Both Divisions Band C have experienced a more steady
work flow, and number of employees.

Division A, in contrast,

completed a major expansion in 1989-1990 in terms of both
business and the number of employees.

The differences in the

work flow as well as in tenure of employees may also have
affected the accident rates.

When the work flow is erratic,

safety can sometimes take second place to meeting production.
In terms of tenure, newer employees may be more prone to

TABLE 5
DIVISION B OSHA 200 RECORDABLE
ACCIDENTS
·.

.

.··

...

1992

1991

1990 ..

0

0

2

2

3

0

2

0

2

1

0

1

1

7

1

0

1

0

3

2

0

1

0

2

1

0

0

0

2

0

1

3

0

2

0

0

3

2

2

0

0

0

2

4

0

0

0

1

0

3

0

0

1

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

7

4

8

7

23

20

1989· 1988

.·.

1•·•···••··· .

\
•·

.1tihe
.·

.· .. ·. . .

gµly

>
·.··•··•·

•·

·•

/August>·.

octobe:r

<

·Total

··.·.·

.

.>.<-.-::-

.. ·.

accidents, as they are often unfamiliar with work procedures
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and equipment.

However, as a norm, all three divisions work

under the same basic operating procedures.

The only noted

difference among the divisions in terms of the implementation
and

administration

of

the

safety

program

Division's A $100 bill drawings in 1990.
divisions

conducted

the

was

that

of

Otherwise, all the

safety program per the

corporate

instructions.

TABLE 6
DIVISION C OSHA 200 RECORDABLE ACCIDENTS

"' ·•·•··•·.··· .
February
..

.· ....·•·March

•· I//•·••

1993

1992

1991·· 1990

1989

0

2

3

0

2

0

3

0

4

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

3

2

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

2

0

0

1

2

0

1

1

1

2

1

5

2

1

3

0

2

1

2

3

0

0

2

0

2

2

0

0

2

0

0

2

0

1

0

3

1

2

0

0

2

0

1

3

9

8

22

11

18

18

...
1

.....

.....

April

Jurte
·.

·.·

\Itlly

>

August .
.September
.

·.

Qct;pber .·.•
· November
...

December
1.

Total

. ..

While the three divisions did see a decrease in the
number of accidents overall during the course of the safety
program, there has been no causal relationship demonstrated.
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Increased training, continued tenure and therefore experience
level of the employees, as well as new OSHA requirements are
some of the other factors that could greatly affect the number
of accidents in the divisions.

Therefore, it is difficult to

state definitively that the safety program resulted directly
in the decrease in the number of accidents for the three
divisions.
decreases

In fact,
in

the

the erratic pattern of increases and

number

of

recorded

accidents

for

each

division suggest a need for further study of this area.
Management Perceptions
Because of the small sample size of the management
survey, a general review of the comments made on the surveys
allows a limited view of how those managing the safety program
perceive

it.

One

of

the

managers

surveyed

commented:

"Personally I think our facility is extremely safe.
rarely get hurt by accident.
careless."

They usually get hurt by being

This manager felt that the safety program should

not be continued in its present format.
seven

management

statement,

responses

all

However, the other

answered

"yes"

to

the

"I would like to see the current safety program

continue in its present format.
safety

People

included

having

Suggestions to

11

individuals

involved

in

improve

accidents

discuss the situation to the other employees during the safety
meetings,

being

more

severe

with

careless

employees,

increasing employee awareness and involvement, and utilizing
the

safety committee

in accident

investigation.

Another
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manager proposed the creation of a
charge

of

safety

with

a

budget

corporate position in

for

training

films

and

materials for use of all the divisions.
All of the surveys received did not answer fully whether
the divisions had implemented the corporate safety programs
per the company guidelines in all of the applicable fiscal
years.

However, all eight responses did answer affirmatively

in regards to holding the safety meetings each month for all
employees.
Employee Perceptions
Overall,

the majority of the employees of the three

divisions felt that the work environment was safe (see Table
7).

Sixty-nine percent felt that safety procedures were

followed most of the time.
the

time)

that

convenient.
they

safety

However, 29% responded (some of

procedures

are

only

followed

when

Almost half (49%) of the employees answered that

follow

safety procedures,

hazards "always."

as

well

as

report

safety

Fifty-eight percent of the respondents

state that they correct any safety hazards that are in their
control.

In regards to supervisors,

88% of the employees

answered affirmatively to "I feel my supervisor believes in
safety," while 81% agreed that their supervisor practices
"safety first."

The largest area of disagreement was to the

statement "Safety is not important in my job."
percent responded with always/most of the time:
some of the time/never.

Thirty-nine
61% responded

However, 95% of the employees agree

74

that they follow safety procedures always/most of the time.
In regards to the specific parts of the company's safety
program,

it appears that the employees perceive the safety

meetings as having the greatest impact on their behavior.

TABLE 7
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY OF SAFETY PHENOMENON

Always/
Most of
the time

Some of
the
time
/Never

In this company, safety procedures
are followed.

86%

14%

I follow safety procedures.

95%

5%

I report safety hazards.

84%

16%

I correct those safety hazards
that are in my control.

90%

10%

I feel the company believes in
safety.

88%

12%

I feel my supervisor believes in
safety.

88%

12%

Management corrects safety
problems quickly.

72%

28%

I feel that my safety concerns are
treated seriously.

72%

28%

Safety meetings provide me with
information that helps me in my
job.

68%

32%

Safety hazards are not corrected
in a timely manner.

32%

67%

Safety is not important in my job.

39%

61%

Safety procedures are only
followed when convenient.

33%

64%

My supervisor practices "safety
first."

81%

19%

Statement
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Eighty-two

percent

responded

strongly

agree/agree

to

the

statement "I feel the safety meetings actually help change my
behavior

to

be

safe."

Seventy-seven

positively to the statement

"I

feel

the

percent

responded

safety

incentive

programs actually help change my behavior to be safe."

When

these statements were re-worded, "The safety incentive program
does not help me to be safe," and "the safety meetings do not
help me to be safe," similar results followed, suggesting the
measures provide reliable results.

The use of safety posters

in affecting the employees' behavior was seen as helpful only
by half of those responding.

When asked if it is possible to

reach both productivity rates and work safely, 74% responded
positively.

Eighty-nine percent of the employees believe it

is possible to reach both quality standards and work safely.
These responses are reinforced by the 75% of the employees
responding positively to the statement:

"I believe it is

possible to reach both productivity and quality standards and
work safely."
In another section of the questionnaire, the employees
were asked to respond yes or no as to the importance of the
individual parts of the safety program,
factors that could affect safety.
found in Table 9.

as well as other

The total results can be

While 87% of the employees felt that both

the safety incentive program and the monthly safety meetings
were important, three other factors received greater positive
responses.

Ninety-six percent of the employees responded that
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orientation training was important to safety.

Employee morale

(90%) and quality standards (89%) also received high positive
responses.

When asked to rank the top two factors that are

important to employee safety at the company, the most often

TABLE 8
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY PROGRAM AND WORK STANDARDS
Agree/
strongly
Agree

Disagree/
Strongly
Disagree

I feel the safety meetings
actually help change my behavior
to be safe.

82%

18%

I feel the safety incentive
programs actually help change my
behavior to be safe.

77%

23%

I feel the safety posters actually
help change my behavior to be
safe.

52%

48%

I believe it is possible to both
reach productivity rates and work
safely.

74%

26%

I believe it is possible to both
reach quality standards and work
safely.

89%

11%

The safety incentive program does

26%

74%

The safety meetings do not help me
to be safe.

18%

82%

The safety posters do not help me
to be safe.

36%

63%

I believe it is possible to reach
both productivity and quality
standards and work safely.

75%

24%

Statement

not help me to be safe.
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cited first and second choices were orientation training (18%)
and employee morale (15%).

The safety incentive program and

monthly safety meetings were the second most cited factors.

TABLE 9
EMPLOYEES' PERCEPTIONS OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SAFETY
Items Relating to Safety

Yes

No

Safety Incentive Program

87%

13%

Monthly Safety Meetings

87%

13%

Orientation Training

96%

4%

Productivity Standards

56%

44%

Safety Posters

61%

39%

Work Hours

78%

22%

Quality standards

89%

11%

Employee Morale

90%

10%

The question "I receive the safety incentive "Fox Bucks"
for:

(check any/all that apply)" was asked to survey the

employees' understanding of the company's safety program.
results are shown in Table 10.

The

The highest response was for

having no accidents, and the second highest response was for
attending safety meetings.

These are the top two components

of the company safety program.

The other program requirement

of showing up for work only received a response rate of 42%.
However,

this

factor

had

just

been

incentive program during the past year.

added

to

the

safety

It is interesting to

note that 60% of the employees ranked working safely as a
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component of the safety program.

While this factor could be

interpreted as being the same as having no accidents, per the
literature review it is known that having no accidents does
not necessarily imply working safely.

The difference rate in

responses, 74% for having no accidents, while 60% responded
working safely, may reflect that some employees realize the
difference between the two points.

TABLE 10
EMPLOYEES' KNOWLEDGE OF SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS

I receive the safety incentive "Fox Bucks for:
(Check any/all that apply.)

ILw

Activity

%

74%

having no accidents

63%

attending safety
meetings

42%

showing up for work

18%

completing tasks

18%

helping others

60%

working safely

When

asked

questions

about

Activity

their

recognition

and

retention of the format of the safety program, there was an
increase in the numbers of no responses.

However,

45% of

those responding had participated in the safety incentive
program for all four years.

When asked to list the amount of

"Fox Bucks" they received last year, 14% replied that they had
received the maximum amount, while almost half did not answer.
The employees were also asked whether or not they remembered
any of the prizes they had selected

from the catalog

in
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previous years.

A little over half of the employees responded

that they did.

Although the lack of responses affects the

data,

it

appears

that

the

prizes

remembered than the Fox Bucks.

themselves

In fact,

are

better

over 50 different

prize items were recorded by the researcher in response to the
request to list those prizes received.
When surveyed as to which safety meeting topics were seen
as most helpful,

42 topics were mentioned.

However, there

were several topics that were listed multiple times.
safety was the most often cited

(n=25)

employees work more safely at home,
(n=12)

was

techniques

topic that helped

while forklift safety

the most popular work topic.
(n=14)

out/Tag out,

an

Proper lifting

was cited for both work and home.
OSHA

Lock

safety training requirement was also

cited (n=lO) as a helpful work safety topic.
listed kitchen safety,

Fire

The employees

electrical safety and tornado/storm

safety as other popular home safety topics.
A

review

of

the

correlations

between

different

demographic groups and various sets of questions from the
employee survey did produce some areas for further study.
Correlations run between sex and assorted questions resulted
in no significant relationships.

In the divisions surveyed,

there was a fairly equal balance of both male (56%) and female
(44%)

employees.

From these results,

it appears that the

employees' attitudes on safety within this company are not
affected by gender.
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Correlations run between tenure and other variables, for
the

most

However,

part

did

not

produce

any

significant

results.

in responses to the statement "I feel the safety

incentive programs actually help change my behavior to be
safe," there was a one-tailed significance (r=-.15, p~.01).
This may signify that the more tenured employees feel that the
incentive program does help safety within the organization.
As a result, the organization could look at ways of attracting
the attention of less tenured employees to the program.

This

correlation may have connections to the high rating given
the

surveyed

employees

training in safety.

to

the

importance

of

by

orientation

Perhaps increased training in safety, and

on the safety incentive program should be built into the
orientation

training

program,

in

order

to

help

the

less

tenured employees perceive the value of the safety incentive
program.
In

another

correlation

run,

there

was

significant

response to the statement "I feel the company believes in
safety" and the number of non-reported accidents experienced
(r=.15, p~.01).

This may reflect that those employees who

experience few or none non-reported accidents strongly believe
the company supports safety,

and vice versa.

For further

review, it may be beneficial to encourage employees who have
accidents,

reported

or non-reported,

to

speak openly and

honestly as to what they perceive to be the cause of the
accidents.

Until root causes of accidents are found, there
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will continue to be accidents.
Those employees who had few or no non-reported accidents
also strongly responded to the statement
safety concerns are treated seriously."
demonstrated

throughout

the

"I

feel

that my

(r=.16, p.:5..0l)

literature

review,

As

employee

autonomy and the state of labor-management relations can play
an

important

role

in

safety.

This

correlation

tends

to

support the theory that employees who feel that their comments
and ideas are both listened to and acted upon will feel that
their environment is more safe.
It is interesting that the strongest correlation among
those reporting few/no non-reported accidents is that to the
statement "I believe it is possible to reach both productivity
and quality standards and work safely" (r=. 23, p.:5.. 001) .

This

may also be linked to the issue of employee satisfaction, in
that employees are more productive when there is quality of
worklife, autonomy, and solid communication between employees
and management.
The

demographic

group

that

resulted

correlations was that of union status.

in

the

most

In response to "I feel

safety meetings actually help change my behavior to be safe",
the negative correlation

(r=-. 25, p.:5.. 001) reflects that union

employees may tend to respond more negatively, while non-union
employees responded more on the positive side.
negative correlation to

the

statement

"I

feel

There was a
the

safety

incentive programs actually help change my behavior to be
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safe"

(r=-.30, p~.001), and a positive correlation to "The

safety incentive program does not help me to be safe" (r=.22,
p~. 001).

These results suggest reliability on the correlation

that those of union status do not feel the safety incentive
program helps in promoting safety.
The union status employees also demonstrated a negative
correlation to the statements "I believe it is possible to
both reach productivity rates
p~.001)

and

productivity
.30,p~.001).

"I
and
In

believe
quality
fact,

it

and work safely,"
is

possible

standards
the

and

researcher

to
work
had

(r=-.34,

reach

both

safely"(r=specifically

developed these questions with the union status in mind, as
many union members had previously commented that the standards
forced employees to work at a pace that did not allow time to
complete tasks safely.

This may be an area

research by the company,

in searching for root causes and

system problems causing accidents.

for

further

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
Implications
In looking for the answer to the research question:

can the safety program be more effective?
a definitive answer may not be necessarily found.

However, as

with any program, the research project can be used as a tool
for evaluation.

A review of the questions asked earlier in

this thesis sets up an evaluation of the safety program.

1.

Do

the

employees

understand

the

current

safety

program?
The majority of the employees were able to correctly identify
the two main components of the program.

However, a little

less than half (42%) were able to identify the third factor of
showing up to work.

In reviewing the significance of this

difference, a review of the safety program reveals that the
attendance factor had only been added to the safety incentive
program during the past year.
more

successful

in

making

Perhaps the company might be
additions

to

the

program

by

utilizing a different and/or better form of communication of
changes to the program.
different

levels

of

On the other hand,

recognition

highlight

perhaps the

the

disparity

between the area of safety (having no accidents and attending
83
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the safety meetings) and the area of attendance (showing up
for work) .

The safety program may be better understood by the

employees if only behaviors directly related to safety are
included.
2.

How safe do employees feel in their jobs?

Overall, most employees felt that the work environment was
safe.

Employees themselves felt that they followed safety

procedures and reported and/or corrected safety hazards.
large

majority

of

employees

also

reported

supervisors believed in and practiced safety.

that

A

their

This last

factor is extremely important in creating a safe environment,
because management commitment, in this case demonstrated by
the supervisors' actual practices, is vital to a strong safety
program.
3.

How important is safety?

While the employees recognize the safe environment they work
in, there seems to be disagreement as to the importance of
safety.

The

response

to

the

statement

"Safety

is

not

important in my job" resulted in 39% answering "always/most of
the time."

Perhaps the safe environment is being taken for

granted, or that employees of a specific area, for example the
office,

do

not

see

their

environment

as

particularly

hazardous.
4.

What do employees feel help them in working safely?

The answer to this question is interesting in that it differs
from the emphasis the company places on various parts of the
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safety program.
a

The employees rated safety meetings as having

greater impact on their behavior

incentive program (77%).

(82%)

than the safety

However, when asked to respond to

the importance of individual parts of the safety program,
orientation training received the highest response (96%), even
though

this

area

has

management as others.

not

received

as

much

emphasis

by

Employee morale and quality standards

were also highly rated, with the safety incentive program and
monthly safety meetings also mentioned.

The main emphasis of

the company has been on the incentive program and monthly
meetings.

The implications of the employee's perceptions are

mirrored by the findings of the many safety studies reviewed
in this paper.

Training and quality of worklife are very

important components of a successful safety program.
5.

What kind of impact,

in terms of how well

they

remember from year to year, does the safety program have
on employees?

The increase in the numbers of no responses to questions in
regards

to the

incentive part of the

suggest that the
minimal.

The

safety program may

impact of the prizes over the years

responses

also

reflect

that

employees

remember individual prizes more than the FoxBucks.

is
may

This may

help the company in choosing items for incentives in future
programs.

The varied response to the question of which safety

meeting topics were seen as helpful suggests that the safety
meetings themselves had a strong impact on the employees.

It
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appears that topics that were repeated each year, such as fire
safety

and

lock

out/tag

out

were

well

remembered

and

appreciated.
For this research project, two hypotheses were developed.
Hypothesis 1:

Incentive programs focused on accident rates

alone do not prevent accidents.

In terms of the numbers of accidents, while the overall
numbers did decline for the three divisions surveyed, there
were erratic increases from year to year.

In addition, the

employees' perceptions of the safety program reflect that they
believe other components of the
beneficial to their safety.

safety program were more

The low recall of prizes from the

incentive program as compared to the high recall of safety
meeting topics might demonstrate that attention to safety
hazards is more beneficial to employees than attention to
accident rates.

And, in conclusion, more employees responded

that safety meetings affect their behavior than the safety
incentive

program.

Therefore,

some

factors

do

support

hypothesis one.
Hypothesis 2:

A safety program. that directs attention to safe

behavior will help lower the number of accidents.

There was an overall decrease in the number of accidents
during the implementation of the safety program.

The safety

meetings, in addressing specific topics, provide attention to
safe behavior in hazardous situations.

The strong support of

the employees on the issue of safety meetings, and the fact
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that the safety meetings are the oldest part of the company's
safety

program

hypothesis.

might

be

perceived

Most importantly,

as

support

for

this

the literature review cites

many studies and success stories of companies that focus on
safe behavior as the root cause of an accident problem.
fact

that

the

employees

rated

quality

standards

The

as

an

important factor for safety reflects that employees can see
themselves the similarity of quality and safety.

Getting

employees involved in creating a safe environment is just as
important as having the management commitment.

In conclusion,

there is support for hypothesis 2 in both the research results
and the literature review.
In summary, this research has shown that the company is
on the right track in providing a safe environment.
emphasis

on the

incentive side

of the

program,

Less

and more

emphasis on employee involvement and training may help make
the company safer.

In addition, switching from review of the

downstream factor of the OSHA 200 accident rates,

to the

upstream factors of safe behaviors may aid the company in
focusing their time and money on the specific parts of the
safety program that need further development.
Ideas for Further Studies
If the company were to decide to alter the safety program
in the future, it might be beneficial to design both a preand post-study which could isolate the various components of
the safety program.

Establishing a direct causal link between
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variables

would

provide

the

improving a safety program.

most

beneficial

advice

on

While much research has been

conducted on various safety programs,

it appears that the

causal links between the program itself and the end result is
most often the area of biggest uncertainty.

Once causal links

are established, the longevity of results would be another
area of research to pursue.
In summary, there are many factors to review in setting
up a safety program for an organization.

Most importantly,

there must be a fit between the organization and the program
itself.

The Association of American RailRoads studied all of

the United States' railroad safety programs.

"' They found

little program uniformity and no elements really essential to
program success.

Their results suggest the safety program

must be right for the specific organization .•• There is no one
safety program that is right for all'" (Petersen, 1988,
p.

27).

Continued

research

in

the

areas

of

incentives,

positive reinforcement and feedback, employee attitudes, and
organizational behavior management will assist in providing
more insight in how to tailor safety programs specifically to
an organization's culture.

In our quest for the ultimate

safety program, that may be the most important factor of all.

APPENDIX 1

EMPLOYEE SURVEY
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SAFETY SURVEY
The purpose of this survey is to ascertain your ideas and
feelings regarding ----,---'s safety program. Specifically,
we would like to determine what parts of the program are more
effective than others.
By taking the time to complete this
survey, you will be able to help improve the safety program,
and overall safety at _ _ _ _
THE INFORMATION IN THIS
SURVEY WILL ONLY BE USED IN A SUMMARY FORM: YOUR INDIVIDUAL
ANSWERS WILL BE HELD CONFIDENTIAL.
Thank you for your time
and contributions.
DEFINITIONS
Safety incentive program:
program held during fiscal year
which awards "FoxBucks" for attendance at safety meetings,
time with no accidents, and daily attendance.
Safety meeting: monthly meeting held at each division, where
safety topic is presented, and safety issues/concerns are
addressed.
Productivity standards:
standard set for warehouse workers
regarding amount of work accomplished.
Quality standards:
standard set for warehouse workers
regarding allowable amount of errors.
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BY CIRCLING THE BEST RESPONSE:
MOST OF
SOME OF
ALWAYS THE TIME THE TIME NEVER
In this company, safety
procedures are followed.
2
1
3
4
I follow safety procedures.
1
2
3
4
I report safety hazards.
1
2
3
4
I correct those safety
2
1
4
3
that are in my control.
1
2
I feel the company believes
4
3
in safety.
I feel my supervisor believes 1
2
3
4
in safety.
Management corrects safety
1
2
3
4
problems quickly.
2
I feel that my safety
1
4
3
concerns are treated seriously.
Safety meetings provide me
1
2
4
3
with information that helps me in my job.
Safety hazards are not
1
2
4
3
corrected in a timely manner.
Safety is not important in my 1
2
4
3
job.
Safety procedures are only
1
2
4
3
followed when convenient.
My supervisor practices
1
2
3
4
"safety first."
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safety
Do you
on the
CIRCLE
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)

survey page 2
think the following items are important to your safety
job?
Y FOR YES, ORN FOR NO
YES NO

safety incentive program
monthly safety meetings
orientation training
productivity standards
safety posters
work hours
quality standards
employee morale

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N

Please choose two items from above that you feel are the most

important to your safety at
, and put a #1 and a #2 in
front of them to rank them. - - - I receive the safety incentive "Fox Bucks" for: (Check any/all
that apply.)

safety meetings
- - -having no accidents
- - -attending
completing
tasks
showing
up
for
work
- -helping others
- -working safely
___
___
PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING BY CIRCLING THE BEST RESPONSE:
STRONGLY
STRONGLY
AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE
I feel the safety meetings 1
2
3
4
actually help change my behavior to be safe.
2
3
I feel the safety incentive 1
help
change
behavior
be
safe.
programs actually
my
to

4

1
2
3
I feel the safety posters
actually help change my behavior to be safe.

4

3
I believe it is possible
1
2
to both reach productivity rates and work safely.

4

3
I believe it is possible to 1
2
both reach quality standards and work safely.

4

The safety incentive
1
2
program does not help me to be safe.

3

4

The safety meetings do not
help me to be safe.

1

2

3

4

The safety posters do not
help me to be safe.

1

2

3

4

I believe it is possible to 1
2
3
4
to reach both productivity and quality standards and work
safely.
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safety survey page

3

Please place number of accidents you have been involved in
while working at _ _ _ _ , under the appropriate categories.
(med=medical treatment)

No Med
Treatment
Nece~sary

Accidents:
I• ..

Med Treatment
No Time Off
work

Med Treatment &
Time off work

&
'

/.

·•·

Reported
Non-Reported>··
Demographics

Age_ _ _ _ __

Sex: _ _male

female

Functional Area of Work (please circle one):
office
warehouse
facility services
data processing
inventory control
quality control
transportation
Length of time in current position
years ____months
Length of time with____
years ___months
Previous

work

functional

Are you (please circle one):
What division are you in:

area

(if

Union

applicable)
Non-Union

----------------

I have participated in the safety incentive program in: (Please
circle ALL that apply)
Fiscal
Fiscal
Fiscal
Fiscal

year
year
year
year

'94 (4/1/93-3/31/94) (current year)
'93 (4/1/92-3/31/93) (Sears gift certificate)
'92 (4/1/91-3/31/92) (prize catalog)
'91 (4/1/90-3/31/91) (prize catalog)

Please list the amount of "Fox Bucks" you received last year:
If you participated in the program one of the years using the
prize catalog, do you remember what you ordered?
_ _-1,yes
___no
If yes, please list the prizes you received:
Please list any safety meeting topics that you think
specifically helped you to work safely at work & home:
What do you think would make

a safer place to work?

APPENDIX 2

DIVISION ARCHIVAL SURVEY
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Management Questionnaire--Safety Survey
PLEASE NOTE THAT THIS PAGE NEEDS ONLY BE FILLED OUT ONCE PER
DIVISION.

However, this information is crucial to the study; please
complete as thoroughly as possible.
Please list the number of OSHA 200 recordable accidents, as
recorded on your OSHA 200 form for each year •
.
·.-::_-:-:-

··.·.·. . . .-·

1992.

>.January•
>:.:...........

.··.··••··

Februa:ry
> <March ... •·

April
. . · May

y"tily•···
Atigust .·••·· ••·

September
· Qctober ·.·
November
December
Misc. notes/comments:

1991

··1990 ..

1989

1.988 .•.

APPENDIX 3

MANAGEMENT SURVEY
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Management Questionnaire--Safety Survey

THIS PAGE SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 1) DISTRIBUTION CENTER
MANAGER, 2) DAY OPERATIONS MANAGER, AND 3) NIGHT OPERATIONS
MANAGER.
Separate envelopes have been provided to ensure
confidentiality. THE INFORMATION IN THIS SURVEY WILL ONLY BE
USED IN A SUMMARY FORM: YOUR INDIVIDUAL ANSWERS WILL BE HELD
CONFIDENTIAL. Thank you for your time and contributions.
We implemented the corporate safety programs per guidelines in
(please circle all that apply):
FY'91
FY'92
FY'93
FY'94
If any changes or additions were made, please explain:

In FY'94, what have you done with the FoxBuck cards provided
by corporate?
Are there any other factors that you feel would have had
impact on the number of accidents? If so, please explain:
1)
Factor:
2)

Time Frame:

3)

Proposed impact:

We hold a safety meeting
(please circle one)
YES
NO
If you circled
meetings:

no,

please

for

all

explain

employees

when

you

every month.

hold

safety

who attends:
I would like to see the current safety program continue in its
present format.
(please circle one:) Yes
No
I think we could improve safety by:
THANK YOU!
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